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NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS
how inﬂuential is economics?
Summary
Economists often claim that their discipline has a great inﬂuence on the economy. An analysis
of the existing literature reveals, however, that little convincing empirical evidence exists. The two
approaches used are subject to major shortcomings. The ‘Economics Production Function’ relat-
ing the input of economic ideas to economic outcomes, is faced with major estimation problems.
The ‘Revealed Behaviour Approach’ of choosing to study economics is based on very restrictive
assumptions. It is argued that the ‘Case Study Approach’ analysing speciﬁc policy instances con-
stitutes a more promising avenue and should be undertaken to identify more general patterns of
inﬂuence.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Economics is often taken to be the ‘Queen of the Social Sciences’. There is
a higher degree of consensus about its approach and content than in many
other social sciences (such as, for instance, in sociology or psychology). Many
economists jump to the conclusion that they do have considerable inﬂuence
on society. They believe that economics makes a major and beneﬁcial contri-
bution to the solution of economic and social problems. They routinely refer
to the many economists called as policy advisors, and the prominent posi-
tions some economists have attained in politics. But such activities refer to
the inﬂuence economics may have on the input side. Whether economics as a
discipline has indeed an effect on the economy refers to the outcome or out-
put side. Economists’ input may or may not have an impact; and it may raise
or lower social welfare. The widespread belief among economists of the large
effect of economics on society is (at least so far) not based on any convincing
empirical evidence.
This communication is part of the emerging ﬁeld of the ‘Economics of
Economics’ (e.g. van Bergeijk et al. (1997); Ma¨ki (1999); Van Dalen (2003);
Coupe´ (2004); Kirchga¨ssner (2005)), but it does not intend to provide a gen-
eral survey.1 Rather it focuses more narrowly on how the inﬂuence of eco-
nomics and economists can be empirically identiﬁed.
1 See, for instance, for recent contributions with extensive references to the literature Ste-
phan’s (1996) survey on the “Economics of Science”, Frey and Eichenberger (1993, 1997),
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Section 2 shortly reviews some well-known claims made by economics
scholars regarding the inﬂuence of their discipline. The following section crit-
ically discusses two major avenues that have been used to capture the inﬂu-
ence of economics and economists: The ‘Economics Production Function
Approach’ and the ‘Revealed Preference Approach’ in terms of individual’s
decision to study economics. Section 4 argues that a more useful avenue is
the ‘Case Study Approach’ analysing particular policy events. The last section
sketches aspects to be considered in order to make progress in evaluating the
inﬂuence of economics and economists.
2 CLAIMS ABOUT THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS
The best-known statement about the inﬂuence of economists is due to Key-
nes (1936, p. 383): “(T)he ideas of economists and political philosophers . . .
are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled
by little else.” Interestingly enough, in Keynes’ statement, economists share
this position with political philosophers, who by most other people are rarely
assumed to have much (direct) inﬂuence on the world. Hayek (1991, p. 37)
agrees with Keynes, but adds that “. . . economists have this great inﬂuence
only in the long run and indirectly”. Similar views of the strong achievement
and impact of economics have more recently been put forward by Dasgupta
(1998) or Baumol (2000, p. 38), who writes: “In our discipline, the century has
been full of accomplishments. New ideas, new directions, and powerful new
tools have emerged in the profession. Evidently, our ﬁeld of study is alive and
well.” The former US Secretary of the Treasury, now President of Harvard
University and noted professor of economics, Summers (2000, p. 1) clearly
expresses the notion that economists have a great impact on society when he
states that “(w)hat economists think, say, and do has profound implications
for the lives of literally billions of their fellow citizens”.
But there are also contrasting claims. The Economist (1997, p. 13) writes
about the “Puzzling Failure of Economics” and, concerning the future of eco-
nomics (2000, p. 90), asks: “In the long run, is the subject dead?” Indeed, in
recent years the media have increasingly turned to so-called ‘analysts’ working
in the ﬁnancial sector who interpret economic events exclusively with respect
to their impact on share prices. The New Yorker (Cassidy (1996, pp. 50–51))
comments “. . . a good deal of modern economic theory, even the kind that
wins Nobel Prizes, simply does not matter much”. Cassidy argues that today’s
leading economists are often unknown beyond their narrowly deﬁned ﬁeld;
only a few books written by academic economists catch the attention of the
general public (see also Blendon (1997)). According to that article, politicians
Wible (1998), Klein (1999), Garnett (1999), Mirowski and Sent (2002), the Journal of Economic
Methodology (2002) and the Journal of the European Economic Association (2003).
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are less and less interested in the economics literature, but turn to academics
with a higher proﬁle from other ﬁelds.
It may well be argued that these are journalistic statements not to be
taken seriously. But similar views have also been advanced in the academic
discourse. Clower (1989, p. 23), a former editor of the American Economic
Review, states that “(m)uch of economics is so far removed from anything
that remotely resembles the real world that it is often difﬁcult for economists
to take their subject seriously.” Even Nobel Prize recipients in economics,
such as Leontief (1971), Coase (1994) or Buchanan (2000), criticise their ﬁeld
for its lack of involvement in real life issues. The most devastating judgement
is, however, made by Blaug (2002): “Modern economics is sick; economics has
increasingly become an intellectual game played for its own sake and not for
its practical consequences”.
Other academic economists seem to accept that economics does affect soci-
ety, but are critical of whether or not this inﬂuence has been beneﬁcial. One,
not surprisingly, is Galbraith (1975), writing “the economic profession – I
choose the words with care – is intellectually bankrupt. It might as well not
exist”. A similar statement has been made from the ideologically opposite
side, namely by Friedman (1972, p. 12): “We economists in recent years have
done vast harm – to society at large and to our profession in particular by
claiming more than we can deliver”.
These are some of the claims made about the effect of economics and
economists on society (see also the excellent accounts in Middleton (1998),
Reder (1999))2. In order to make more deﬁnite statements about the effect
of economics, theoretical approaches need to be identiﬁed and the respective
empirical evidence scrutinized.
3 EXISTING APPROACHES
Two approaches have been used in an effort to identify and measure the effect
of economics and economists on the economy: A macro-economic approach
based on estimating a Production Function for economics (subsection A) and
micro-economic approach using Revealed Behaviour in terms of choosing to
study economics (subsection B). Both are shown to be subject to grave short-
comings.
2 Many studies deal with the application of economics to real life issues but are little, or not
at all, concerned with the question of whether these applications have been put into practice
and have had any effect. A good example is the survey by Baumol (2000), whose central con-
tention is that “theory, empirical investigation, and application” (p. 30) have been integrated.
But even this contention is not undisputed; thus Reder (1999, p. 330) writes “. . . the salient
factor is the relative weakness of the link between theory and application in economics.”
298 DE ECONOMIST 154, NO. 2, 2006
3.1 Macro-Economic Approach: Economics Production Function
The inﬂuence of economics and/or economists on the economy and society
may be analysed by systematically linking the input provided by economics to
the outcome in the form of the state of the economy, i.e. by empirically esti-
mating an aggregate Economics Production Function. The state of economy S
can be modelled to depend on three input factors: economic theory E, other
social sciences O, and additional factors A.
S= f(E, O, A).
The state of the economy S can be captured in various ways. Relevant possi-
bilities are the level or the rate of growth of per capita income, the rate of
unemployment, the rate of inﬂation, the value of the stock of ﬁrms traded
at the stock exchange. Recently, the concept of the national income has
been extended by measuring subjective well-being or happiness (see e.g. Frey
and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005)). A more partial indicator would be, for
instance, the intensity of innovative activity. The input by economics and/or
economists E can be measured by the number, share or growth rate of econo-
mists, or by the number and quality of research articles published and quoted.
Obviously, these measures may be convenient, and data may be available, but
they can hardly do justice to the deﬁnitional problems discussed in the previ-
ous subsection. The input by other sciences (variable O) can be captured by
the corresponding ﬁgures for political science, policy science, sociology or law.
The factor A is a vector of variables capturing all other determinants unre-
lated to the inﬂuence of either economics or the other social sciences. They
can range, for instance, from foreign exchange crises to technological innova-
tions, from natural disasters to political events such as wars. The factors O
and A are controls serving to capture the inﬂuence of economics in an unbi-
ased way. It need not be emphasized that all this is easier said than done.
There are many different views as to how the functional relationship might
look. A very negative one is from Allen (1979, pp. 18–19) writing that “. . . a
country’s economic progress is in inverse proportion to the distinction of its
economists”. Wyplosz (1999, p. 60) claims that there is no relationship: “The
economic successes of France and Japan seem to indicate that economic pol-
icy can be carried out perfectly well without economics”. Stigler (1982, p. 63)
believes that “(e)conomists exert a minor and scarcely detectable inﬂuence on
the societies in which they live”3.
3 For other analyses linking economics to policy see e.g. Blankart (1981), Peacock (1991,
1992), Hamilton (1992) and Jones and Cullis (1993).
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To my knowledge, the Economics Production Function for economics
has not been estimated4, with the exception of Barro (1993), who jokingly
described the relationship between the economists in the US Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors and the state of the economy in the following way:
“. . . economic outcomes (measured by the contribution to the mis-
ery index) and the credentials of the chairman of the council (mea-
sured by citation counts) are essentially uncorrelated. Although some
who are highly ranked on citations . . . do well on performance, the
highly ranked Mr. Schultze ends up with the worst economic out-
comes. Moreover, some of the chairmen who ranked low on citations
. . . emerge with good economic performance”5.
Estimates of ‘spillovers’ on commercial innovations of academic research, as
undertaken e.g. by Jaffe (1989) or Acs et al. (1991), may be interpreted as a
special variant of scientiﬁc Economics Production Functions.
Formulating an Economics Production Function offers one distinct advan-
tage. Attention is focussed on a clear separation between input and output
of economics, a distinction often overlooked when discussing the importance
of economists. Formulating an Economics Production Function helps to over-
come a major shortcoming of many claims, which presume as a matter of
course that offering economic advice, and being active as a politician, is the
same as actually inﬂuencing the course of society. An Economics Production
Function also makes clear that the state of the economy depends on a great
many factors, and that the input of economic ideas and of the activities by
economists is only one of them. It helps to avoid the special interest view
which attributes economic successes to economics and economists, while eco-
nomic failures tend to be attributed to other inﬂuences or bad luck. The
approach is also useful as it is explicitly based on a comparative view: There
are representatives of many other disciplines, such as for example lawyers or
political scientists, who inﬂuence the state of the economy. Even if the role of
economists can be empirically established, it could still be possible that their
inﬂuence is minor compared to other disciplines.
There are, however, serious disadvantages to the Economics Production
Function Approach. Most importantly, causality cannot be established, at
least with the data normally at hand. The construction of a Production
4 Cicarelli and Spizman (1984) specify a “production function for economic knowledge”,
where the departments of economics at major universities are taken to be the ﬁrms responsible
for producing the output of the special knowledge industry, namely economics itself.
5 Magee (1992) estimated an economics production function for lawyers using a cross-section
analysis for 54 countries. Taking into account various other factors (F), it turns out that law-
yers have an inverted U-shaped inﬂuence on economic growth, i.e. there is an optimal number
of lawyers. Having too many lawyers produces major negative external effects.
300 DE ECONOMIST 154, NO. 2, 2006
Function assumes that the input of economics is an exogenous factor (par-
tially) determining the economic outcomes. The coefﬁcient showing the effect
of economics on outcomes can be seriously biased if economics is in turn
inﬂuenced by economic outcomes. The causation is likely to be also in the
reverse direction: Economists start studying issues when they have become
visible in society. Moreover, the services of economists may well be requested
only when there are problems in society for which politicians and public ofﬁ-
cials cannot ﬁnd an easy answer. Economic ideas may well affect society only
indirectly, as suggested by Hayek (1991, p. 37). A variable can simultaneously
affect both economic science and society, so that a correlation is only seem-
ingly causal. The time lag between the economic ideas being proposed and the
effect on society is moreover uncertain6. The scarcity of data will normally
make it impossible to empirically determine the lag structure as a whole.
Finally, the basic prerequisites for estimating an Economics Production Func-
tion are not fulﬁlled: “. . . the market [for economics] at the production possi-
bility frontier is inefﬁcient in the sense that, given the output of pure theory,
we could achieve a better output of applied work. We are not at the produc-
tion possibility frontier” (Mayer (1993, p. 10)). These problems make it prac-
tically impossible to identify the effect of economics on economic outcomes.
These shortcomings are serious. They suggest that an econometric estima-
tion of an aggregate Economics Production Function is unlikely to be suc-
cessful even if the major data problems could be overcome.
3.2 Revealed Preference: The Choice of Studying Economics
An indirect, more micro-economic, way to study the inﬂuence of economics
on society is to analyse Revealed Behaviour. When individuals choose their
subject of study, in addition to their intrinsic interest in the discipline they
(at least implicitly) also take into account the future demand for their services
and the corresponding income situation. The larger the expected contribution
to society of a person trained in economics, the greater will be this demand.
As a consequence, the inﬂuence of economists on society is reﬂected in the
share of persons deciding to study economics and in their income. In so far as
this demand is fully reﬂected on a monetary market, a larger inﬂuence is vis-
ible in higher average compensation compared to persons who studied other
disciplines.
The Revealed Preference Approach can also be applied at later stages
of the career. If economists inﬂuence society in their role as practitioners
6 For example, Schelling (1997, p. 146) states that it took twenty years until economic pro-
posals entered environmental policy, but such a dating is certainly open to debate, and varies
considerably in extent according to the area or country. Hayek (1991, p. 37) vaguely speaks
of a “long run” effect, leaving it open whether he means ﬁve, ten, twenty or even more years.
See, in general, Colander and Coats (1989).
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there will be a higher demand for their services, and there will be both a
higher number and they will enjoy higher income. This holds in particular
for being employed in the public administration (see Coats (1981, 1989)) in
international organisations (Coats (1986)), and in public or private research
institutes (e.g. Cockett (1995)). They can establish consultancy companies,
a sector which recently mushroomed in the USA and elsewhere, and may
appear as expert witnesses (Mandel (1999, p. 115); Posner (1999)). There are
also many economists who have achieved distinguished positions in politics.
Restricting to professors of economics and just taking two countries as exam-
ples, in the Netherlands Lubbers, Zijlstra, and De Quay were prime ministers,
Andriessen, Duisenberg, Witteveen and Zalm ministers of ﬁnance, and Pronk
and Ritzen were ministers in other departments. At the federal government
level in Germany, Erhard was a professor of economics becoming chancel-
lor, Schiller became ﬁnance minister, and To¨pfer and Hankel served as heads
of other ministries. Inﬂuence can also be expected when economists serve as
advisors in public institutions, such as the US Council of Economic Advis-
ors or the German Sachversta¨ndigenrat (see, recently, Schultze (1996); Feld-
stein (1997); Stein (1997); Stiglitz (1997)), or other academic advisory boards
attached to ministries. Academic economists can also act as indirect suppliers
through their research activities and teaching, thus shaping the knowledge of
a future generation of economists.
The demand for economists is partly produced by the economics pro-
fession itself. Economic theories favouring government intervention increase
the demand for economists in public advisory boards and within the pub-
lic administration7. According to Friedman (1986, pp. 8–9), one reason why
Keynesian theory became accepted so quickly was that “. . . it opened up
such wonderful opportunities for employment and inﬂuence by economists
. . . the New Deal was the greatest employment programme for economists
that ever existed“. In the 80s, the policy of privatisation and deregulation also
increased the demand for economists in the private sector.
The choice to study economics as a discipline shows considerable variation.
Consider the United States where the number of students majoring in eco-
nomics dropped drastically by 30 per cent between 1992 and 1996, while the
number of doctoral students fell by 18 per cent in the same period (Siegfried
(1998)). Moreover, a considerable number of American PhD graduates in eco-
nomics leave the country later (Siegfried and Stock (1999, pp. 116–118)), indi-
cating an even more drastic decline in the number of US American students
embarking on a PhD programme. This interpretation is also supported by
the fact that many PhD programmes at American universities rely on for-
eign participants for their survival. The United Kingdom (Middleton (1998,
p. 360); Machin and Oswald (1999)) faces a similar problem. In Germany,
7 But there is a free-riding problem involved: an individual economist has little incentive to
produce the public good of higher demand.
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university departments of economics are threatened by the lack of students
while business economics ﬂourishes. Teaching or carrying out research in eco-
nomics seem to have lost some of their appeal. Many talented young students
no longer see general economics as an option. Instead, they move toward spe-
cialising in ﬁnance, labour and resource economics, with the intention of ﬁnd-
ing a job outside academia. A degree in general economics does not seem
to be necessary, nor sufﬁcient for a practical career (see also Hansen (1999),
Krueger (1999) and the reports to the American Economic Association and
the Royal Economic Society by Krueger et al. (1991) and by Towse and Blaug
(1998) respectively). Just 3 per cent of American graduates consider a thor-
ough knowledge of the economy as crucial for their exams, as opposed to 57
per cent, who regard ﬁrst class knowledge of mathematics as decisive. A fur-
ther 65 per cent think that the ability to solve formal problems is vital. Stu-
dents of economics are reported to be increasingly dissatisﬁed with their ﬁeld
(Siegfried and Stock (1999, p. 130), see also Colander and Klamer (1987)).
According to Krueger (1999, p. 155) “business and public policy schools . . .
begin training their own PhDs rather than drawing heavily on the output of
economics departments”.
In a well-functioning, perfect market without external effects or monop-
olistic structures, the wages paid for economists reveal their presumed inﬂu-
ence on society. In the case of the private sector the necessary conditions
are likely to be met: “. . . the ability to command large sums for economic
expertise helps provide a market-based validation of the worth of studying
economics” (Mandel (1999)). Consider again the United States where uni-
versities are more exposed to a market setting than in most other countries.
Real average incomes of PhDs in economics dropped by 4.6 per cent in the
period 1987–1995, despite the fact that the length of time spent on educa-
tion had increased by 6 per cent in the same time. In other words, the rate
of return on human capital has continuously dropped since 1987 (Siegfried
and Stock (1999, p. 132)). The income differential also widened, if econo-
mists are compared with other qualiﬁed professionals, among them persons
in entertainment, sports, and managers of large enterprises (Ehrenberg (1999,
pp. 137–140)). It should however, be noted that in most countries today’s uni-
versity system does not correspond to a well-functioning market. Entry is
severely limited and incomes are ﬁxed by administrative rules. The incomes
of academics therefore do not, or only imperfectly, reﬂect the evaluation of
the inﬂuence of economists on society.
The indirect approach of looking at Revealed Behaviour suggests that, at
least for the United States, economic ideas transmitted by persons educated
in this discipline have a smaller inﬂuence on society than they did in ear-
lier periods. This is reﬂected in relatively lower compensation and fewer per-
sons majoring in economics. This statement must be seriously qualiﬁed. The
conclusion rests on important conditions. The most important ones are that
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the persons involved must be reasonably well informed, so that they react to
changing circumstances in an appropriate way. The choice of studying eco-
nomics must react signiﬁcantly, and within a reasonable time span, to changes
in the perceived usefulness of economics to society. The effect on economists’
relative wages is visible only if the increased demand noticeably affects mone-
tary compensation. This is more likely to be the case for the market economy
than for the non-private sector. Market wages only fully reﬂect usefulness to
society when external effects are absent. All these are very stringent condi-
tions making it doubtful whether the Revealed Preference Approach is useful
to empirically measure the inﬂuence of economists on economic outcomes.
3.3 Evaluation
The discussion of the two approaches leads to a clear conclusion: Both the
Economics Production Function and the Revealed Preference Approach have
serious shortcomings. Even if better data were available, the two approaches
are unlikely to be able to convincingly demonstrate the effect of economics
and economists on economic outcomes.
4 A MORE FRUITFUL APPROACH: CASE STUDIES
The Case Study Approach analysing speciﬁc policy instances seems to con-
stitute a more promising approach than the econometric estimation of an
Economics Production Function or the analysis of Revealed Behaviour by
individuals studying economics. It is argued that future research should
concentrate on a considerable number of case studies in speciﬁc historical pol-
icy episodes. The knowledge gained may allow us to identify general patterns
of inﬂuence of economics on society.
So far, there are only a few case studies empirically analysing the effective-
ness of economic ideas. As Klamer and Meehan (1999, p. 65) note, “the lack
of research on the actual importance of economists and their science on poli-
ticians and their policies is astonishing”, and, one may add, the same is even
more true for the inﬂuence on policy outcomes.
Schelling (1997) discusses many different areas in the United States in
order to isolate the inﬂuence of economics on policy making: abortion, race
relations, illegal drugs, crime and punishment, health care, budgetary, defence
and environmental policy. He “observes how little difference economic anal-
ysis appears to make in most important policies” (Schelling (1997, p. 134)).
He emphasizes that his study only relates to the United States and that con-
ditions may be different in other countries.
Cordes et al. (1993) ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of economic ideas on the
American tax reform of 1986 was only minor. They even propose that econ-
omists may have had some inﬂuence, but not economics. Concerning the
establishment of NAFTA, Klamer and Meehan (1999, p. 1) conclude: “. . .
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political arguments crowd out serious economic arguments . . . academic
economists had no role to play when it came to the ﬁnal act”. Similar views
are aired by Cassidy (1996) (see also Krugman (1995)) with respect to the
reform of the American health and welfare system. The same has also been
observed in a study for Germany (Wilke (1999)). It looks at the inﬂuence of
economic ideas proposed by economic advisory councils and by the Coun-
cil of Economic Experts (Sachversta¨ndigenrat) to government departments
regarding the ﬁnancing of public health insurance (the Pﬂegeversicherung).
Research on how economic ideas enter – or fail to enter – political deci-
sions are only in the initial stages. In particular, the role of the media has
received very scant attention. According to Rivlin (1987), the media pick
up some economic ideas, especially when they are controversial, yet ignore
other economic ideas. But even when the media do report economic ideas, it
remains an open question whether they succeed in putting economic knowl-
edge into action.
It should be noted that these case studies refer to the impact of econom-
ics on policy. But even if economics would indeed inﬂuence policy (which,
according to these studies is doubtful) it is still open whether there is any
effect on societal outcomes. It cannot be excluded that in those cases in which
economics inﬂuences policy, the policy is ineffective.
5 FUTURE RESEARCH
This communication critically discussed two approaches used to empirically
capture the inﬂuence of economics and economists on the state of the econ-
omy. It has been shown that both econometrically estimating an Economics
Production Function and analysing individuals’ Revealed Behaviour in terms
of choosing economics have major shortcomings. Even if the required data
were fully available, they are unlikely to provide satisfactory answers to the
question to be analysed.
It is argued here that the Case Study Method is best able to produce valu-
able insights into how, and to what extent, economics and economists inﬂu-
ence the economy in particular instances and sectors. Future research should
undertake a substantial set of case studies of speciﬁc historical episodes to try
to identify general patterns of inﬂuence. However, results from case studies
are difﬁcult to generalise. Moreover, the existing studies focus on the inﬂuence
of economics on policy, rather than on outcomes. To get a more complete pic-
ture, it is necessary to also analyse the effect of economics and economists on
the state of the economy. This is a long way to go.
Before making further progress the research studying the inﬂuence of eco-
nomics has to come to terms with the following issues8:
8 See also the considerations in Klamer and Meehan (1999, pp. 65–69) and in Garnett (1999,
p. 5).
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(1) What ‘economics’ means is not clearly deﬁned. But many economists such
as the prominent US policy advisor, Schultze (1996, p. 26), are convinced
that “(t)here is a distinct consensus among economists”, namely the so-
called ‘Washington Consensus’ (see Williamson (1994)). It does not only
designate what such advisors take to be relevant for the United States
but far beyond because ‘Washington’ here also refers to the international
ﬁnancial institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund. This consensus has been claimed to encapsulate “the common core
of wisdom embraced by all serious economists” (see Middleton (1998,
p. 344)). Its major recommendations are that an active economic policy
should ﬁght microeconomic distortions, while safeguarding the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium, in particular by balancing the state budget. ‘Typically
economic’ proposals have been identiﬁed by Reder (1999, chapter 11) and
Stigler (1982) to be, for instance, the notion of an independent central
bank (see Blinder 1997), free trade, privatisation or deregulation (the lat-
ter two are regarded as “success stories” by Nelson (1987)). On the micro-
level, typically ‘economic’ instruments are market-based environmental
taxes, vouchers, negative income tax, road and peak load pricing (Faul-
haber and Baumol (1988); Baumol (2000)), pay for performance, stock
options (e.g. Prendergast (1999)), or auction rules for the allocation of,
for example, radio and TV frequencies (e.g. Joskow et al. (1998)).
The actual extent of the consensus existing among professional econ-
omists has been the subject of several empirical studies9. These sur-
veys asked professional economists their opinions on concrete theoreti-
cal and policy issues. Considerable differences in opinions were identiﬁed.
Professional economists certainly do not agree on what ‘good econom-
ics’ is. There is, however, more consensus among American economists
(who adhere more strictly to neo-classics) than among European econo-
mists (more of whom hold Keynesian views) and with respect to micro-
rather than to macro-economic issues. The dissent identiﬁed can partly
be explained by historical and institutional differences. Thus, for exam-
ple, in the 80s, French and Austrian economists were much more inclined
to welcome government intervention in the economy than were Amer-
ican, Swiss and German economists. It would be a mistake to assume
that there is a generally accepted ‘economic view’. Hence it is not possi-
ble to make any general claims about the inﬂuence of economics on soci-
ety. Because there are such divergent views as to what economics is, any
9 For the United Kingdom, Brittan (1973) and Machin and Oswald (1999); for the United
States, Kearl et al. (1979), Alston et al. (1992); for several European countries including
France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland, Frey et al. (1984). van Dalen and Klamer (1997)
discuss the views of various schools of economics in the Netherlands and Fuchs et al. (1997)
and Samuels (1980) analyse the consensus with respect to public ﬁnance and foreign trade
issues.
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serious research must ﬁrst carefully deﬁne what one refers to. An obvious
possibility would be to deﬁne the ‘neo-classical textbook orthodoxy’ rep-
resented in the leading American textbooks to be what economic theory
is, and the ‘Washington consensus’ to be what economic policy propos-
als are. It must be kept in mind that the many professional economists
who do not accept these deﬁnitions will not feel represented by whatever
results are reached.
(2) ‘Economic’ ideas can originate from both economists and non-econo-
mists; they may come indirectly through other disciplines which have
adopted economic ideas; and they may be similar, or even the same, as
ideas coming from other disciplines. They can be produced in organiza-
tions, such as think tanks, research institutes, scientiﬁc networks, founda-
tions or private consultancy ﬁrms, with people from many different dis-
ciplines contributing. Economic ideas may also indirectly affect the econ-
omy and society via other ﬁelds. The extent of “economic imperialism”
(Stigler (1984); Lazear (2000)) has been taken to be “. . . an important
indicator of the success of economics” (Demsetz (1997, p. 1)). It is also
important to distinguish between economic ideas, which actively want to
bring about a change for the better, and those which want to prevent a
change for the worse. Economists such as Krugman (1996) and Schultze
(1996,
p. 31) argue that the main contribution of economics is to prevent ‘major
blunders’. In all these cases it is difﬁcult, and often impossible to separate
inﬂuences coming from economics from those originating elsewhere.
(3) The term ‘inﬂuence’ is open to many interpretations. In this regard the
Economic Production Function Approach provides a useful framework.
It shows in particular that the inﬂuence by economics and economists
is at best marginal (in the sense of micro-economics but not necessar-
ily in the sense of size). The term ‘inﬂuence’ suggests a unidirectional
impact of economics on outcomes in society. But it must be taken into
account that social conditions in turn inﬂuence economic science. As is
well known from econometrics, to establish a causal inﬂuence when there
is a mutual interaction is most difﬁcult, and often impossible especially
when the underlying data are weak (which is certainly true for the case
here considered).
(4) The term ‘(policy) outcome’ is ill deﬁned. It may range from an out-
come pertaining to a particular sector of the economy to overall measures
such as national income or aggregate life satisfaction. In the case of par-
tial indicators of outcome, possible substitution effects must be taken into
account. Thus, economic advice may indeed have an impact on a particu-
lar activity, but it may at the same time be overcompensated by counter-
active changes in other areas.
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(5) The effect of economics on societal outcomes may occur over an extended,
but unknown, period of time. Here again the Economic Production
Function Approach is helpful to conceptually disentangle the possible
time lags. When economic advice has no identiﬁable effect on outcomes
in a given period, this does not mean that there is none. But conversely,
care must be taken not to attribute some random effect to the inﬂuence
of economics solely because this effect takes place with a ‘reasonable’ time
delay.
It should be noted that it does not make sense to determine in general how
‘economics’, ‘inﬂuence’ or ‘outcome’ is deﬁned. Rather, the appropriate deﬁni-
tion must be chosen to suit the question the particular study wants to answer.
There is still a long way to go before research will have produced convinc-
ing empirical evidence about the inﬂuence of economics and economists on
economic outcomes. Until such progress has been made, economists in their
scientiﬁc capacity should be careful about making general claims about the
inﬂuence of economics on the economy.
Bruno S. Frey∗
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